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Theoria cum praxi [theory together with practice], the motto Leibniz placed at the beginning 
of some of his writings (Vermeulen 2015, 41), encapsulates the principle that motivated and 
guided Leibniz throughout his life. Leibniz conceived the true value of theoretical inquiry to 
lie in its capacity to enhance the common good. His inquiries were never conducted purely 
for knowledge’s own sake. Rather, he considered every area of study to have some practical 
value: 
 
[i]f we regard the disciplines in themselves, they are all theoretical; if their 
application, they are all practical. (Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria [Dissertation on 
the Art of Combinations], 1666. A VI 1, 229; L 74) 
 
In Leibniz’s age, the improvement of health, living and working conditions and the securing 
long-term peace among the peoples of a war-torn Europe were key areas where the 
application  of theory to practice could produce the greatest  beneficial outcomes. Poverty, 
ill-health and war remain major concerns, but the most pressing issues of our own age 
coalesce around the destruction of the natural environment due to exploitative and 
disrespectful human action, manifesting today in anthropogenic global climate change. It is 
the contention of this paper that various of Leibniz’s strategies in relation to theoria cum 
praxi might usefully be invoked to help heal the fractured, dysfunctional relationship between 
humans and the rest of the natural world.1  
 
Following some introductory remarks on Leibnizian harmony and his proposed strategies for 
the restoration of harmony through the resolution of conflicts, sections I and II consider 
Leibniz‘s theoretical studies on language and conceptual analysis and their role within 
Leibniz’s efforts to foster European-Chinese cultural exchange. Leibniz was convinced that 
                                                     
1 The full potential of Leibniz’s philosophy for environmental thought and policy has yet to be fully 
explored, but see Merchant (1980, 279-83); O’Briant (1980), Shirkova-Tuiat (1998), Phemister (2001, 
2003, and 2016). 
 
the advancement of peace and harmony among humans was most effectively secured through 
encouraging mutual understanding and collaborative enquiry. Cultural exchange has a part to 
play, but so too do the research investigations and practical projects tasked to the scientific 
academies envisaged by Leibniz, to which we turn in section III.  Finally, in section IV, we 
discover how today Leibniz’s approach and vision resonates, albeit implicity, in the methods 
and aspirations of Denise Herzing’s fascinating Wild Dolphin Project. In this, we find the 
Leibnizian vision of mutual understanding and respect among humans being extended 
beyond the human, helping to foster harmonious relationships between humans and other 
creatures in nature and encouraging the development of sound environmental policies for 
their protection. 
 
Principles of harmony, unity, variety and order or perfection pervade Leibniz’s theoretical 
philosophy. On his view, the world is a harmonious ordering of perceiving and embodied 
substances.  Each perceives the same world, but does so from its own unique perspective 
through the prism of its own body located in its particular position in space and time. Each 
individual’s body is in constant flux as it responds and adapts to alterations taking place in 
the world at large. In parallel, each individual embodied soul or entelechy, as a “living 
mirror” of the world, is also constantly changing as it reflects or registers changes happening 
in each and every one of the world’s constituent entities. As reflections of this changing 
whole, each individual’s perceptions correspond in content, structure and order to the content, 
structure and order of the world itself. Individuals’ differing perspectival viewpoints mean 
that not all – and not always the same – parts of this orderly structure are perceived distinctly 
by each individual: a fish perceives the environment of the ocean relatively distinctly, but 
perceives the terrestrial environment only obscurely or insensibly, while the opposite is the 
case for land-bound mammals. Nevertheless, all perceive the same world and in this way, the 
universe as the aggregate whole comprising these mutually perceiving beings, is itself both 
varied and ordered and, indeed, perfect. Unfortunately, however, this mutual correspondence 
of individuals’ perceptions is not matched by harmonious social and ethical relations among 
living beings. Just as in Leibniz’s age, war and other types of conflict continue to wreck lives, 
communities and environments. Humans have not yet found ways to live in peace, either with 
each other or with their nonhuman fellow creatures.  
 
For the resolution of disputes over religious doctrine, Leibniz advocated three strategies: 
linguistic clarity, religious toleration, and incremental progress (to Bossuet, undated, before 8 
 
May 1699. FC II 264-5; Riley 189-90).2 These strategies are easily adapted to other forms of 
conflict. The injunction to proceed incrementally recognized that the less serious doctrinal 
differences could be resolved without great difficulty and should be dealt with first, before 
moving on to tackle more intractable points of disagreement. In advocating toleration, 
Leibniz was drawing attention to the fact that some differences of opinion really “made no 
difference” and could easily be “tolerated” by both parties to the dispute without harm being 
done to the core beliefs that each shared. The first strategy, clarification of linguistic 
terminology, is the most significant for the purposes of this paper. Here, Leibniz points out 
that some disagreements are purely verbal, arising simply from semantic misunderstanding 
(to Bossuet, no date, post 8 May 1699. FC II 264; Riley 189). When the meanings of the 
terms used on either side are clarified, understanding is restored and disagreement dissolved. 
Terminological clarity, in turn, is sought through analysis of the concepts signified by the 
terms employed on both sides. Conceptual analysis exposes those points where the 
disputants, using different terminology, appear to disagree, but are fundamentally in 
agreement because their respective terms actually refer to the same concept. In the following 
section, we outline Leibniz’s views on the analysis of concepts and terms and his vision of a 
universal language. In the subsequent section, we will see how Leibniz used concept analysis 
to help resolve the question whether the Chinese had a concept akin to that of the Western 
concept of the Christian God.  
 
I. Languages, the language of thought and the ars characteristica 
Leibniz’s early steps towards the development of a universal language are found in his 
Dissertation on the art of combinations, published in 1666.3 The first task is to identify the 
simple concepts or terms4 that provide the building blocks from which more complex 
concepts are formed. Complex concepts are to be analyzed into their simpler and ultimately 
into their simplest, not further analysable, components. So, for instance, concept x might be 
                                                     
2 Roinila summarizes Leibniz’s three strategies as follows: “The first one was the exactness of 
language (all the participants understand all the concepts the same way – one reason more to develop 
the characteristica universalis!), the second was the religious tolerance and the third one was progress 
in little steps (one should leave the most difficult issue to be solved last)” (Roinila 1997, 112). 
3 Leroy Loemker describes the Dissertation as containing “the germ” of Leibniz’s plan to establish “a 
universal characteristic and logical calculus” (L 73). 
4 Massimo Mugnai explains that Leibniz is known to have used “the Latin expression corresponding 
to the English word ‘term’ in a quite loose way, sometimes referring to the concept associated with a 
given word, sometimes referring to the linguistic term itself, and sometimes, finally, meaning the 
complex made of a word and a concept”  (Mugnai 2018, 188). 
 
found to include simpler concepts AB and CD and these in turn are analyzable into the 
simple parts, A, B, C, and D. The next task is to devise a reliable truth-checking and truth-
producing mechanism – effectively a universal grammar – for recombining or synthesizing 
the simple concepts into complex ones. Recombination can be used to confirm previously 
analyzed concepts and may, in some cases, lead to the discovery of new concepts, as, for 
instance, to the complex ABCD, previously analyzed into sub-complexes AB and CD, there 
might be added AC and BD provided the combinatory mechanism or syntax of the language 
permits.5  
 
In the years following the publication of the Dissertation and through the Paris years of 1672-
1676, Leibniz set his mind to devising a characteristica universalis [universal characteristic] 
or alphabet of thought. The idea was to assign a non-semantic sign or symbol to each simple 
concept. These signs would be such that they incorporated the basics of a universal grammar 
or set of rules for their combination into complex terms and propositions. Again, the 
procedure would serve both as a method for demonstrating known truths and as a tool for the 
discovery of new truths:  
 
one can devise a certain alphabet of human thoughts and [that], through the 
combination of the letters of this alphabet and through the analysis of words produced 
from them, all things can both be discovered and judged. (Preface to a Universal 
Characteristic, 1678-79. A VI 4, 265; AG 6-7) 
 
For Leibniz, it was important that the signs or symbols were not words taken from any actual 
spoken language and should be such that they are accessible to all peoples irrespective of 
their own natural language (Perkins 2004, 142). “Ordinary languages,” writes Leibniz, “are 
guilty of countless equivocations and cannot be used to perform the task of a calculus” (A VI 
4, 919; Dascal 1987, 182). No two people understand the same word or sound in exactly the 
same way. What is needed for the characteristica universalis are ideographic characters that 
directly represent their ideas or concepts, without the intervention of sounds are interpretable 
in diverse ways by different people (Perkins 2004, 142). In short, as Marcelo Dascal explains, 
the kind of algebraic reasoning envisaged by Leibniz’s universal characteristic requires that 
“our thought be ‘blind’, i.e. that the mind concentrate exclusively on the signs themselves and 
                                                     
5 Dissertatio de Arte Combinatoria (A VI 1, 165-230; part of which is in L 76-80). 
 
on the operations performed upon them, without caring to ‘interpret’ these signs as it 
proceeds” (Dascal 1987, 43). 
 
Nevertheless, the connection between the symbol and the concept is not an arbitrary 
association. Rather the sign or symbol attached to a simple concept should be such that it 
contains some indication of the relations the concept has to other concepts with which it 
might be combined (Perkins 2004, 142).6 Among possible candidates, we know that Leibniz 
considered seriously the ideographic characters of the Chinese.7 However, in the 
Dissertation, he proposed using a numerical symbolism (A VI 1, 195). Leibniz’s Elementa 
Calculi [Elements of a Calculus] (April 1679) contains a helpful illustration of how this 
might work.  Analyzing the complex concept “man” into the component concepts “animal” 
and “rational”, and assigning the number “2” to “animal” and “3” to “rational”, Leibniz 
proposes that the number to be assigned to “man” be calculated simply by multiplying “2” by 
“3”, giving “6” as the number for “man”.8 The factors of the number assigned to any given 
concept indicate simpler concepts contained therein. Since “6” , the number for “man”,  has 
factors  “2” (signifying “animal”) and “3” (signifying “rational”), we can conclude (if we did 
not already know) that anything that is a man is also an animal and is rational.  In general, the 
characteristic numbers assigned to particular species of animals will be divisible by 2, but the 
characteristic numbers assigned to non-rational animals, although divisible by 2, will not be 
divisible by  3. So, if horses are non-rational animals, the term “horse” might be assigned the 
even number “10”, but could not be given the number “12”, since 12 is divisible by 3.9  
 
Once the simple concepts have been identified through analysis, their characters assigned, 
and the syntactical rules for their synthesis or combination determined, we would have at our 
disposal a properly universal language,10 useful both for the verification and for the discovery 
                                                     
6 See also Preface to a Universal Characteristic (A VI 4, 269-70; AG 10). 
7 Perkins (2004, 141-6) details Leibniz’s deliberations on Chinese ideographic characters and his 
hopes that they might be adapted in ways that would allow them to serve as characters in his own 
universal characteristic. 
8 “The one rule for discovering suitable symbolic numbers is this: that when the concept of a given 
term is composed directly of the concepts of two or more other terms, then the symbolic number of 
the given term should be produced by multiplying together the symbolic numbers of the terms which 
compose the concept of the given term” (Elements of a Calculus, LLP 17; C 49). 
9 Conversely, if the number for “horse” were 12 and hence divisible by 2 and by 3, this would indicate 
that horses were indeed rational animals. 
10 The development of a universal language has been described by Mugnai as “the most precocious 
and the most persistent” of Leibniz’s philosophical projects (Mugnai 2018, 177). 
 
of previously unknown truths.11 The universal language would facilitate communication and 
foster mutual understanding. Assuming with Spinoza and Hume that we find it easier to love 
those with whom we feel the greatest affinity, the use of a common language can be expected 
to promote loving, peaceful relations between people. An example of Leibniz making use of 
linguistic analysis to help establish peaceful relations among peoples can be seen in his 
efforts to promote cultural engagement between Europe and China, to which we now turn. 
 
II. China: language, religion and cultural exchange 
From his youth to the end of his life, Leibniz’s fascination with China and its culture 
remained unabated.  Franklin Perkins reminds us that Leibniz refers to the pictographic rather 
than phonetic nature of the Chinese language in his 1666 Dissertation on the art of 
combinations and that one of only a handful of books Leibniz published in his lifetime was 
an edited collection of writings on China, the 1697 Novissima Sinica [News from China]. 
Even at the very end of his life, Leibniz was working on his longest and most detailed essay 
on Chinese philosophy – his unfinished 1716 Discourse on the Natural Theology of the 
Chinese (Perkins 2004, 42-3). Here, we focus on this unfinished work and in particular on an 
argument there that will lead us back to the early programme of the art of combinations. 
 
Perkins conceives Leibniz’s central motivation in respect of China as his “desire to increase 
the exchange of knowledge between China and Europe” (Perkins 2004, 118).12 Undoubtedly, 
East and West had much to learn from each other.  However, an even more fundamental goal 
underpins this epistemological advancement: the promotion of peace between nations. 
Knowledge of the other’s culture and values, history and traditions, science and technology 
engenders the mutual understanding, trust and respect upon which peaceful and harmonious 
relationships among people are built. 
 
As was noted earlier, Leibnizian individuals are “living mirrors” that express the world from 
their own unique perspectives, each perceiving the world through their bodies that locate 
                                                     
11 Relatedly, Leibniz also envisaged the compilation of an encyclopaedia of human knowledge that 
would draw together into one repository all that was currently known in each area of enquiry and be, 
essentially, a record of the current state of play and the starting point upon which to build and expand. 
The academies (see section III below) were conceived as essential for the implementation of this 
vision. 
12 This desire is second only to the primary ambition to achieve conversion of the Chinese to the 
Christian faith (Perkins 2004, 122). 
 
them in a particular time and place.13 From these perspectives, no finite being expresses the 
whole with absolute distinctness. What one expresses only confusedly, another may express 
distinctly. What is known or understood distinctly within one culture may be only dimly 
perceived within another. Contact with another culture, however, can bring to the surface 
ideas and ways of thinking that would otherwise have remained hidden from within one’s 
own culture. Sometimes, ideas may be distinctly perceived on both sides of the exchange, yet 
their agreement is not recognized because each, speaking in their own natural tongue, fails to 
appreciate the linguistic references of the other. From this can arise needless confusion, 
misunderstanding, disagreement and dispute. Close analysis of the terms used on either side 
can help to determine whether there really is disagreement or whether differences in the 
languages has merely obscured an underlying basic agreement. 
 
In regard to European relations with China, the possibility of Chinese conversion to 
Christianity was high on the agenda, together with the related question whether the Chinese 
had any concept resembling the idea of a Christian God.14 It is to this related question that 
Leibniz applies the analysis of concepts or terms into their simpler parts that he had proposed 
in his youthful Dissertation on the Art of Combinations. 
 
The Christian God is conceived as omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, but also as the 
self-caused, absolute, eternal, infinite, unique, immaterial, indivisible, incorruptible, 
unchanging, all-perfect substance or unity, the Sovereign Reason, intelligence and pure 
activity that is Creator and Lord of Heaven and Earth. Furthermore, the Christian God is 
understood to be the supreme law-maker and law-keeper who ensures, as Leibniz states in 
§15 of the Principles of Nature and Grace, that “there is no crime without punishment, no 
good action without a proportionate reward” (G VI 605; L 640). In the Discourse on the 
Natural Theology of the Chinese, Leibniz examines the Chinese terms “Li”, “Xangti” and, to 
lesser extent, “Tien-Chu” in order to assess whether they might be regarded as equivalent to 
the Western term for “God”.  Leibniz’s methodical analysis of the term ‘Li’ is a particularly 
                                                     
13 See Perkins (2004, 63-5, 81-2). 
14 This was bound up with the so-called “Rites Controversy”. If the Chinese were essentially atheists, 
then their seemingly religious rituals and traditions might remain in place even after their conversion 
to Christianity. However, if the Chinese believed in the existence of a non-Christian god, then their 
rituals and traditions would effectively be religious in nature and would need to be abandoned were 
they to convert to Christianity. Clearly, this dilemma might be resolved if, as Leibniz argued, the god 
of the Chinese was in fact identical with the God of the Christians. For discussion of Leibniz and the 
Rites Controversy, see Perkins (2004, 26-32, 190-4). 
 
thorough investigation in which he attempts to demonstrate that all the features of the 
Christian God listed above are also present in the Chinese concept of the Li.15 Believing he 
                                                     
15 Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, §§4-9. Dutens IV 172-4; CR 79-83).  Li is “the 
foundation of all nature”, “the most universal reason and substance”, of which “there is nothing 
greater nor better.” Li is the “great and universal cause.” Li is “pure, motionless, rarefied, without 
body or shape, and can be comprehended only through the understanding” (Discourse §4. Dutens IV 
172; CR 79).  Li is also “the law which directs all things and is the intelligence which guides them ...  
It is the Law and universal Order, according to which Heaven and Earth have been formed … the 
origin, source and principle of all which has been produced” (Discourse §4a. Dutens IV 172; CR 79). 
The Li is also unique and self-caused. It has no need to rely on the action of any other deity, 
but is “sufficient unto itself.”  It is the eternal ”cause” that moves “Heaven, throughout the centuries, 
in a uniform motion.” Li has “dominion over all; it is present in all things, governing and producing 
all as absolute master of Heaven and Earth”  (Discourse §4a. Dutens IV 172; CR 79-80). Leibniz 
points out that according to Father Longobardi, the Chinese regard the Li as  “(par excellence) the 
Being, the Substance, the Entity,” the  “infinite, eternal uncreated, incorruptible” substance that has 
no beginning and no end.  As the source of everything, it is “not only the principle of the physical 
basis of Heaven and Earth and other material things, but also the principle of the moral basis of 
virtues, customs, and other spiritual things.” Without body, it is invisible. More than this, this 
substance Li is “perfect in its being to the highest degree, and it is itself all perfections” (Discourse 
§5. Dutens IV 172-3; CR 80).  Li is called “the Supreme” or the “Summary Unity”.  This unity is the 
only unity that is “absolutely unitary” and “not at all capable of divisibility as regards its being.” At 
the same time, however, Li is the “principal basis of all the essences which are and which can exist in 
the world.”  Li is also, however,  “the Aggregate or the most perfect multiplicity” for it “contains the 
essences of things as they are in their germinal state.”  Leibniz  goes on to suggest that this be 
understood in keeping with Christian doctrine that holds that “the ideas, the primitive grounds, the 
prototypes of all essences, are all in God” (Discourse §6. Dutens IV 173; CR 80). Later in the 
Discourse, Leibniz even goes so far as to claim that the Li contains possible essences from which it 
then chooses to create those that are “the most appropriate” and that the Chinese had in effect formed 
the “idea of things being created by their natural propensity and by a pre-established harmony’ 
(Discourse §18. Dutens IV 179; CR 93). 
A further feature of the Li requires a creative interpretation if it is to be brought into line with 
Christian thought. Longobardi had favored a materialist reading of the Li, grounded in his 
understanding of the Li as the “Grand Void, the immense capacity (or Space)” that “contains all 
particular essences.” To Longobardi’s absolutist reading of the spatial void, Leibniz counters his own 
relational understanding of space. Under this light, the spatiality of the Li can be understood in the 
Leibnizian sense “not as a substance which possesses parts upon parts, but as the order of things 
insofar as they are considered existing together, proceeding from the immensity of God inasmuch as 
all things depend upon him at every moment.”  In this sense, Li refers to the ordering of things that 
“arises from their relationship to a common principle” (Discourse §7. Dutens IV 173; CR 80-1).  (See 
also Leibniz’s rejoinder to Longobardi’s materialist understanding of the Chinese axiom that “all 
things are one.” Leibniz proposes to understand the axiom that “all things are one” in a rational, less 
literal fashion: all things are one in the sense that they are “all composed of the same prime matter, 
which differs only by the forms which motion gives it” (Discourse §§21. Dutens IV 180; CR 94-5). 
God is not “the mass of all things”, but rather the cause from which all things derive: “all things are 
one by emanation (emanenter), because they are the immediate effects of Him” (Discourse §22. 
Dutens IV 181; CR 95)). 
 Leibniz also attributes a non-literal meaning to Chinese references to the Li as a globe or a 
circle. This, he claims, is not unlike Western references to “God as being a sphere of a circle whose 
center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere.” Leibniz advises too that Chinese 
references to the Li as “the Nature of things” that “possesses Truth and Goodness par excellence” are 
to be read as akin to Western claims that “God is the Natura Naturante” and that this “Nature is wise” 
and “that she does all for an end and nothing in vain” (Discourse §8. Dutens IV 173; CR 82-3). 
 
has shown that the concept of the Li is effectively the same as the Christian concept of God, 
Leibniz ends his analysis by posing the rhetorical question: “can we not say that the Li of the 
Chinese is the sovereign substance which we revere under the name of God?” (Discourse §9. 
Dutens IV, 174; CR 83). 
 
Leibniz conducts similar analyses of the terms “Xangti” (translated as King-on-High, Lord of 
Heaven) and “Tien-chu”, concluding that they are in essence synonymous both with each 
other and with “Li”  (Discourse §28. Dutens IV 186; CR 101-2). Each refers to an eternal being 
“endowed with all possible perfections,” residing in Heaven and governing the world through 
the distribution of rewards and punishment where they are due (Discourse §28. Dutens IV 186; 
CR 102). 
 
The identification of Xangti and Li with Reason16 convinces Leibniz that Chinese theology, 
like that of Christianity, is a natural theology. He writes: 
 
What we call the light of reason in man, they call commandment and law of Heaven. 
What we call the inner satisfaction of obeying justice and our fear of acting contrary 
to it, all this is called by the Chinese (and by us as well) inspirations sent by the 
Xangti (that is, by the true God). To offend Heaven is to act against reason, to ask 
pardon of Heaven is to reform oneself and to make a sincere return in word and deed 
in the submission one owes to this very law of reason. For me I find all this quite 
excellent and quite in accord with natural theology. Far from finding any distorted 
understanding here, I believe that it is only by strained interpretations and by 
interpolations that one could find anything to criticize on this point. It is pure 
Christianity, insofar as it renews the natural law inscribed in our hearts – except for 
what revelation and grace add to it to improve our nature. (Discourse §31. Dutens IV 
188; CR 105). 
 
                                                     
Finally, Leibniz notes, as Longobardi had also observed, that the “Chinese also attribute to 
the Li all manner of perfections, so that there can be nothing more perfect. It is the supreme power, 
the supreme good, the supreme purity. It is supremely spiritual and supremely invisible; in short, so 
perfect that there is nothing to add” (Discourse §8a. Dutens IV 174; CR 83). 
16 “[The scholar Ching-Lu] suggests that reverence should be grounded on reason, by observing the 
relations and proportions between things; only then is it acceptable to the spirits, or rather to the 
Xangti, to the Universal Spirit, or if you wish, to the Li, to the  supreme reason which governs all” 
(Discourse §54a. Dutens IV 199; CR 121). 
 
On Leibniz’s reading, the Chinese concept of God is the same as ours, except for the latter’s 
inclusion of the notions of revelation and of grace. Consequently, had Leibniz fixed upon an 
appropriate characteristic for his universal language, he would no doubt have assigned the 
same characteristic number or symbol to the terms for Xangti, Li, Tien-chu and for the 
Christian God. The universal grammar embedded in the syntax of this characteristic number 
or symbol would then have revealed the logical, rational connections between all the 
component parts of these synonymous concepts.17 Were it realisable, Leibniz’s universal 
language, based on his art of combinations and universal characteristic, would be ideally 
placed to bring to light the rational order, both physical and moral, of God’s creation, and 
bring to light the notions of revelation and grace, already evident to the Christians, but not yet 
evident to the Chinese. 
 
Leibniz considered the potential benefits of cultural exchange grounded in his universal 
characteristic would be advantageous to both parties involved. On their side, the Chinese 
would discover the logical connection between Xangti and revelation and grace. Through 
cultural exchange, this gap in the Chinese understanding of the concept of God could be 
rectified. Conversely, Leibniz’s study of Chinese culture convinced him that the Chinese 
were more advanced in morals than were Europeans.18 Leibniz believed that the Europeans 
had lost sight of their natural theology in favor of revealed theology and this had led them to 
lose sight of the necessary connections between knowledge of God (and His perfections) and 
the virtuous action that arises naturally from the love of God and the pleasurable perception 
of harmony and order of that which God has created, which, once perceived, the soul wills to 
promote and maintain (Perkins 2004, 150).19 The European focus on revelation rather than 
reason had obscured the relations between the concepts of God, perfection, pleasure, and 
                                                     
17 This is because Leibniz’s Characteristic is conceived as “a certain writing or language … which 
perfectly matches the relations of our thoughts” (Leibniz to Gallois, 19 December 1678. A II 1, 669; 
quoted and translated in Pelletier 2018, 166). As such it would be capable of demonstrating the 
agreement of the “relations of our thoughts” to the relations of others’ thoughts: for instance, the 
relations of the thoughts had by the Chinese about Xangti might be shown to agree with the relations 
of the thoughts had by European Christians concerning God. 
18 Leibniz’s assessment of Chinese culture in the Novissima Sinica is summed up by Perkins as 
follows: “Among the Chinese, laws are beautifully directed towards the greatest tranquillity and 
order. People treat their elders and superiors with such reverence that to speak against one’s parents is 
treated as parricide would be treated in Europe. Between equals, there is remarkable respect and 
mutual duty. Peasants and servants treat each other so lovingly and respectfully that they go beyond 
the politest Europeans. The Chinese rarely show any hatred, anger, or excitement” (Perkins 2004, 
146). 
19 See also Phemister (2016, 87-9). 
 
virtue, thereby opening the way to non-virtuous action in pursuit of purely personal gain. 
Through contact with the Chinese,  Europeans could regain their traditional natural 
theological base, which in turn would help revive moral goodness in Europe. Restoration of 
natural theology would remind European Christians of the divine rational foundation of 
ethical obligations that direct them towards peace and goodwill and against war. As Leibniz 
wrote in a letter to the Electress Sophie: 
 
I have said it before, and I say it again: we send missionaries to the Indies to preach 
the revealed religion. That’s all very well. But it seems that we now need the Chinese 
to send us missionaries in return, in order to teach us the natural religion that we have 
almost lost. (To Sophie, 10/20 September 1697. A I, 14, 72; LTS 170)20 
 
 
III. Academies: communication and knowledge expansion 
Leibniz’s recognition of the potential for mutual benefit in the exchange of ideas and 
practices between the cultures of Europe and China is a specific example of his more general 
awareness of the desirability – and indeed the need – for human beings to collaborate with 
each other in their collective endeavours. He writes in his Memoir for Enlightened Persons: 
 
But although individuals of merit and good intention can give us quite fine and quite 
useful things, it is still true that they could do infinitely better if there were a great 
deal of understanding and communication between them. For when each person 
thinks by himself, it happens that different people do the same thing, which is so 
much time wasted; it happens that those who undertake some project lack knowledge, 
materials and other aids which able or educated persons could provide for them. And, 
what is most important, a thousand things can be done by two or three or by several 
[people] who understand each other, which will never be done, or never be done well, 
if they work without communicating […]. (Memoire pour des Personnes éclairées et 
de bonne intention [Memoir for enlightened Persons of good intention] §23. A IV 4, 
618-9; Riley 109) 
 
                                                     
20 Cited in support by Perkins (2004, 151). 
 
The scientific societies proliferating across seventeenth century Europe held the key to 
fostering such collaborative research. Leibniz had first-hand experience of the academic 
societies of Paris and London. He demonstrated his calculating machine at meetings of both 
the French Académie Royale des Sciences de Paris and the Royal Society of London and 
maintained regular correspondence with founding members of both societies, including 
Christiaan Huygens and Henry Oldenburg, for many years after his departure from Paris in 
1676. Back in Hannover, Leibniz set his mind to the establishment of academies in his 
homeland.  Eventually, his efforts bore fruit: on 11 July 1700, Prince-elector Frederick III of 
Brandenburg founded the Electoral Brandenburg Society of Sciences in Berlin. Leibniz 
became its first President and promptly established Theoria cum praxi as the Society’s motto 
(Arthur 2014, 185). Leibniz tirelessly pursued the founding of academies in Dresden and 
Vienna, as well as further afield in St Petersburg, but it was not until 1724, eight years after 
Leibniz’s death, that Czar Peter the Great opened the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St 
Petersburg (Vermeulen 2015, 57). 
 
In keeping with Theoria cum praxi, and in sharp contrast to the Academies in London and 
Paris, Leibniz envisaged his academies as institutions that would  not only advance 
theoretical knowledge, but would also translate these theoretical advances into practical 
projects that would benefit society at large.  To this end, his academies were to include 
researchers from the pure and applied sciences and from the humanities, as well as 
professionals, civic administrators and military personnel (Totok 1990, 208), together with 
practising artisans, technicians and engineers. 
 
Leibniz was keenly aware that the founding of academies relied heavily on political power 
and will21 and similarly alert to the fact that academies require funding to cover researcher 
and practitioner salaries, building maintenance, equipment expenses, and so forth. Yet, as 
Leibniz noted in his Memoir for Enlightened Persons, except for the Royal Academy of 
Sciences at Paris, none of the academies “have the means to pay fairly large expenses” (A IV 
4, 619; Riley 110). Hence, when Leibniz lobbied the Prince-elector to set up an Academy in 
Berlin, he took care to include in his proposal a number of self-financing measures, such as 
                                                     
21 “[F]rom my youth my final goal has been to act for the glory of God by promoting the sciences, 
which best mirror the divine power, wisdom and goodness … I am always prepared to direct my 
thoughts to this great goal, and I have only been looking for a prince who would share these 
objectives” (Leibniz to Golovkin, 6 January 1712: FC VII, 502-3; Roinila 1997, 85-6). 
 
granting the Academy monopolies on the sale of schoolbooks and on calendars with pictures 
of Brandenburg, as well as state funding from  income generated by silkworm production 
(Totok 1990, 208) – eminently  practical details that would enable his vision to become a 
reality. 
 
IV. Ecological lessons 
Climate change is arguably the greatest threat to all forms of life in the current age.  Increases 
in extreme weather, food insecurity, disease, poverty, and migration, significant species loss, 
rising sea levels and local flooding  are some of the effects of anthropogenic global warming 
cited in the  2018 Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that 
“have already had impacts on organisms and ecosystems, as well as on human systems and 
well-being” (Hoegh-Guldberg 2018, 177). Urgently, harmony between humans and the rest 
of nature be restored. 
 
What might we learn from Leibniz as we engage in this task? The immediate response is 
likely to be ‘nothing’ or at best ‘not very much’. Leibniz’s practical projects aimed at 
improving life for humans. The wellbeing of other living things in nature was easily 
overridden in the pursuit of human benefit: for instance, he cared little for the silkworms he 
thought to exploit to finance the academies. Now, Leibniz’s focus on the human is perfectly 
understandable. His was an age in which the majority of Europeans endured harsh living 
conditions, relatively primitive medical care, and survived in the midst of political and 
theological upheaval. The natural world, in contrast, was fairly stable and predictable. Its 
wellbeing did not give cause for alarm. That being the case, Leibniz’s general lack of concern 
for the nonhuman might lead us to infer that his strategies that relate solely to harmony 
among humans have nothing in them that might provide a route to the building of harmonious 
and empathic relations with our fellow creatures. 
 
This, however, would be a mistake. For all that Leibniz’s main concern was human 
wellbeing,  his ideas and practices do have wider applicability in helping to restore ecological 
harmony throughout the natural world. Leibniz’s reminder of the need for collaboration and 
interdisciplinary research is obviously helpful. So too are his model strategies for engaging 
those who have the power to effect change but who do not yet possess the sufficient 
motivation to act. Leibniz’s appeals to powerful rulers focused on finding simple, pragmatic 
solutions to funding difficulties and emphasizing potential benefits to the rulers’ standing and 
 
esteem. Techniques such as these will prove equally effective in relation to national and 
international politicians, local councillors, and leaders of small local enterprises or global 
organizations alike. Local planning officers, for instance, might be persuaded to back 
ecological house building schemes if they could be convinced of their cost effectiveness and 
appeal to the voting public. However, the greatest ecological potential may lie in Leibniz’s 
wider vision to advance communication and knowledge through the analysis of language, 
cultural exchange and collaborations within the academies. 
 
We know that Leibniz intended the Berlin Academy to be far more inclusive than the 
Academies in Paris and London. Theoreticians from disciplines across both the humanities 
and the natural sciences were to work alongside practitioners capable of transforming the 
theoretical results of the former into practical projects to enhance human wellbeing. Even 
today, however, few research institutes actively encourage interdisciplinary exchanges 
between scientific and humanities disciplines and fewer still reach out to non-academic 
practitioners in the wider community, although a trail-blazing few do include poets, 
playwrights, writers and artists. However, a great many more interdisciplinary research 
institutes have the capacity, should they choose to exercise it, to open their doors to non-
academic town planners, architects, farmers, politicians, local counsellors, military personnel, 
advertisers, business leaders, and so forth. Widening participation and opening up discussion 
of environmental issues across society in this way would be a significant step towards 
developing ideas and projects that promote sustainable living. 
 
An even greater step forward would be the extension of the academies beyond the human to 
include nonhumans as well as humans. We have seen the potential benefits of engaging in 
cultural exchanges with people from other nations with different historical backgrounds and 
social structures. Is there not potential to gain also from similar exchanges with nonhuman 
beings? And would not the understanding of other creatures that arose from such exchanges 
encourage and even compel us to consider not just the effects of our behavior on our own 
environments and the threat it poses for our own continued existence, but also to consider the 
effects of our actions on the environments nonhumans inhabit and the threat our behavior 
poses to their continued existence too? 
 
Admittedly, in one sense, nonhumans are already present in many academic research 
institutes and university laboratories, but only as research objects for observation and 
 
experimentation, not as full co-participants in a mutual exchange of information. 
Unquestionably, scientific research that treats nonhuman others as mere objects of research 
often leads to breakthroughs in the treatment of diseases that are of benefit to the species as a 
whole. However, treating nonhuman others as mere research objects does nothing to temper 
our anthropocentric inclinations to value nonhuman beings simply for their utility to humans, 
as happens, for instance, in the testing of pharmaceuticals and cosmetics on animals prior to 
their release for use by humans. When researchers are motivated primarily by the perceived 
or anticipated benefits of the research for human life, there is little incentive – and a deal of 
disincentive – to enter into empathic  - or even sympathetic – relationships with their 
nonhuman research objects and little associated concern for their wellbeing in and for 
themselves. More often than not, it is only when harm inflicted on nonhuman species begins 
to impact badly on human wellbeing that the need to act to protect the nonhuman come into 
clear focus, as we have seen in the recent upsurge of concern for the decreasing bee 
population. 
 
Clearly, the inclusion of nonhuman animals in the academies as mere research objects is 
problematic and hinders our viewing them as ends in themselves with their own needs and 
desires and their own particular perspectives on the world. To counter this, might nonhuman 
beings be included in the academies not just as objects of study, but as actual co-participants 
in collaborative investigations as co-researchers, as it were? Might animals and plants and 
microorganisms be treated as partners with humans within the academies?  Might the 
academies be extended out into the natural world so that they can engage with us on their 
own terms beyond the academy walls? Might there be mutual exchange of information from 
human to nonhuman and from nonhuman to human, so that each side might learn from the 
other?  In short, could there be cultural exchange not just between one human culture and 
another human culture, but also between humans and non-human biological cultures?22 
 
The proposal to include nonhumans as co-participants in the research investigations of the 
academies seems preposterous. How could humans collaborate meaningfully with nonhuman 
beings that don’t speak the same language or even have language at all? However, numerous 
                                                     
22 That we use the term “culture” to refer both to human culture and biological or bacterial cultures 
might give us hope that this question affords an affirmative answer. Interestingly, some biologists are 
already beginning to consider the possibility that bacteria engage in social behavior (Brown and 
Johnstone 2001). 
 
studies over the past decade or so have produced widespread evidence of plant, insect and 
animal communication.23 Organisms certainly communicate within their own species groups 
and some are clearly capable of communicatinig across species boundaries.24 All the same, 
while studies indicate that members of nonhuman species communicate with members of 
their own or other species, including humans, they tend not to consider how humans might in 
turn  communicate information to members of nonhuman species. Yet, if nonhumans are to 
be admitted as partners within the academy and if there is to be genuine mutual exchange, the 
communication has to travel in both directions, from nonhuman to human and from human to 
nonhuman. 
 
One exceptionally interesting study has come close to establishing two-way communication 
with another species. For the past thirty years, researchers on the Wild Dolphin Project led by 
Denise Herzing have been investigating and engaging with Atlantic spotted dolphins in their 
natural habitat in the Northwest Little Bahama Bank to the north of Grand Bahama Island. 
Herzing and her research group are building on now well-established research findings that 
dolphins not only have proper names – signature whistles – that they use to greet and call one 
another, but also communicate by means of a relatively sophisticated language with its own 
semantics and syntax. As Herzing reports, “[d]olphins understand word order (syntax), word 
meaning (semantics) abstract thought, and show self-awareness” (Herzing 2010, 1451). The 
Wild Dolphin Project researchers’ current aim is not just to interpret dolphin language, i.e. to 
discern the meanings of the whistles that dolphins use to communicate with other dolphins, 
but also to open up two-way channels of communication so that information flows not just 
from dolphins to humans, but also from humans to dolphins. 
 
Observing the dolphins playing a game of “go fetch” with their young, teasing them with a 
piece of sargassum before dropping it for the young to recover, the Wild Dolphin Project 
researchers realised that if they could discover the “word” – the dolphin whistle – that the 
dolphins were using as the sign for the sargassum, differentiate it from signs for other items 
used in the game and replicate the whistles that the dolphins used, they would have the 
beginning of a shared language between themselves and the dolphins. To assist them in these 
endeavors, the researchers use a specially designed underwater computer system, CHAT 
                                                     
23 On communication among plants, for instance, see Gagliano et al (2017). 
24 One might instance here the communication between humans and their companion animals. 
 
(Cetacean Hearing And Telemetry).25 This real-time system translates dolphin whistles first 
into computer code and then into the sound of the corresponding human word. Conversely, 
the human terms can be re-translated back into code and then emitted as the appropriate 
dolphin whistle, thereby opening up a channel for interactive two-way communication 
between dolphins and humans. Using CHAT, researchers will, it is hoped, be able to call out 
to particular dolphins using their own signature whistles and also to request them to fetch 
particular items, as for instance, a piece of sargassum. 
 
CHAT also has the potential to allow for the addition of  new “words” into dolphin 
vocabulary by translating human words into “new” dolphin whistles. This opens up the 
possibility of introducing dolphin whistles to refer to the scarves and ropes that the 
researchers have added to the “go-fetch” sargassum game. Wild Dolphin Team members 
have also have also given themselves their own distinctive signature whistles or “dolphin 
names”. The hope is that in time CHAT will enable the dolphins themselves to request 
specific items from humans, and even to request items from a particular human researcher 
(Herzing 2013).  
 
As with all computer programming, the development of CHAT was made possible only 
through the discovery of binary arithmetic, a discovery for which Leibniz himself claimed 
credit. More accurately, Leibniz claimed to have re-discovered binary arithmetic, attributing 
its earlier discovery centuries earlier to the Chinese. The final, though incomplete, part of 
Leibniz’s Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese discusses “the Characters which 
Fohi, Founder of the Chinese Empire, Used in His Writings,” in which Characters, Leibniz  
discerns the fundamental units of binary arithmetic: 
 
In Binary Arithmetic, there are only two signs, 0 and 1, with which one can write all 
numbers. When I communicated this system to the Reverend Father Bouvet, he 
recognized in it the characters of Fohi, for the numbers 0 and 1 correspond to them 
exactly if we put a broken line for 0 and unbroken line for the unity, 1. This 
Arithmetic furnishes the simplest way of making changes, since there are only two 
components, concerning which I wrote a small essay in my early youth [his 
Dissertation on the art of combinations], which was reprinted a long time afterwards 
                                                     
25 Herzing (2014a). 
 
against my will. So it seems that Fohi had insight into the science of combinations. 
(Discourse §68a. Dutens IV, 208; CR 133) 
 
Logically combined into all possible groupings of six characters, Fohi’s broken and unbroken 
lines formed the hexagrams of the Yi Kim or Book of Changes.26 Leibniz recognized in this a 
certain affinity to his own attempts to analyze concepts into their simplest indivisible parts, 
which parts, having been assigned numerical characters, could then be combined using the 
syntactical rules of arithmetical multiplication. By this means, every concept might in theory 
be symbolized numerically, for, as Leibniz notes, all numbers are representable in binary 
arithmetic as combinations of 0 and 1, or alternatively, by the corresponding Fohi characters, 
the broken and unbroken lines.27 By the latter part of the twentienth century, the use of “1” to 
represent “on” and “0” to indicate “off”28 had enabled Leibniz’s re-discovery of binary 
arithmetic to bear fruit through its role in the formation of the modern day computer.29 
Today, the development of computer-assisted speech recognition techniques is helping to 
realize Leibniz’s dream of representing words and concepts by numerical characters. Using 
such techniques to aid communication brings one step closer Leibniz’s vision of a universal 
language. Their use in the Wild Dolphin Project, as we shall discover, has the potential to 
extend the universality of this language even beyond the human. 
 
Together with computer scientist Thad Starner of Georgia Institute of Technology, Denise 
Herzing is analyzing the wealth of dolphin vocalization data sets she has amassed over her 
thirty years of studies on dolphins in the Bahamas. Just as Leibniz had sought to analyze 
concepts into their simple, unanalyzable component parts and then to determine the rules for 
their recombination, so too Herzing and Starner have been looking to identify the most 
fundamental units – akin to individual words – in dolphin vocalizations and seeking patterns 
in the way these units are combined. To date, they have isolated 12 fundamental units, 
naming these with the letters A through to L, and have discovered certain rules that appear to 
govern how these fundamental units are combined: for instance, some of these units are 
                                                     
26 Coincidentally, spectrographic depictions of dolphin sounds are visually remarkably similar to I 
Ching hexagrams. 
27 1 = 1; 10=2; 11=3; 100=4; 101=5; 110=6; 111=7; 1000=8; and so forth.  (Discourse §71: Dutens 
IV, 209; CR 136) 
28 Or, in Leibnizian terms, “1” can be taken to represent being (unity) or activity and “0” to represent 
non-being (nothingness) or passivity. 
29 Leibniz recognised that delays in finding practical applications of theoretical results are common. 
See his remarks to Stahl in defence of anatomical studies (Leibniz-Stahl, LSC 36-7). 
 
frequently combined with certain others  – as for instance, C often occurs after J – while 
others appear never to be found together (Herzing and Starner 2015). 
 
Herzing and Starner have also been looking to link the dolphin vocalizations to dolphins’ 
behavioral patterns and have discovered that the combinatory rules are highly predictive of 
dolphin behavior.30 So, for instance, certain combinatory rules and patterns occur during 
foraging, but not during reunion or play, and vice versa. Indeed, with her detailed knowledge 
of dolphin social interactions, Herzing found that she could predict with a high degree of 
accuracy what the dolphins were doing simply by listening to the sounds that they were 
making (Herzing and Starner 2015). 
 
The discovery of rule-governed dolphin language is intriguing and potentially very exciting 
for it raises the possibility that there might be a universal language that goes beyond even 
what Leibniz envisaged by extending out to embrace not just humans but language users of 
all species. Herzing herself raises the question whether there might at least be some 
“universal features of communication across all species,” but notes also that there has been 
little research into the issue (Herzing 2014b, 535). However, if communicative sounds made 
by other species can be analyzed in the same way as have been those of the Atlantic spotted 
dolphins, comparison of the results across species might lead eventually to the development 
of a (computer-aided) universal language that would enable all living beings to communicate 
with each other. 
 
Leibniz’s claim that all living beings mirror the order and perfection of the world from their 
own perspectives provides a metaphysical framework that supports the probability of a 
syntactical structure common to all the communication systems employed by the various 
types of living beings. Leibniz insisted that all beings perceive or express the same spatial 
and temporal ordering of events.  All do so through their perceptions of their own bodies, 
their perceptions reflecting the changes imposed on their own bodies as they are affected by 
                                                     
30 Starner describes the results thus: “we started finding rules. There seems to be a structure in this 
dataset. There seems to be rules about what can be uttered when, which pattern can be used when in 
this dataset. And so we can see that some things can be put here and other things can’t. That’s really 
exciting. Matter of fact as we went forward we discovered that the rules were better predictive of the 
visual behavior that we see from the dolphins than anything else. Not just the percentage of the 
patterns, not what we call normal grammars, but the rules. In other words much more structure than 
we first thought” (Herzing and Starner 2015). 
 
bodies in the wider, external world : “the soul expresses the state of the universe in some way 
and for some time, according to the relation other bodies have to its own body” (Discourse on 
Metaphysics, §33. A VI 4, 1582; AG 64-5). Some living beings also use their bodies to 
express aspects of the world through language or some other form of expressive behavior.31 
As expressions of the same world that is represented in these creatures’ perceptions, it is 
reasonable to postulate that the basic elements of the expressing language or expressive 
behavior – and the ordered structural arrangement of these elements – correspond to the 
elements and structural ordering of sensory perceptions of the world and to the elements and 
structural ordering of the world itself. Moreover, given that all living beings perceive or 
mirror the same world, which world they express through their language and behavioral 
practices, it is also not unreasonable to presuppose a fundamental common semantic and 
syntactical structure– a universal language – that constitutes the bedrock of all languages and 
other communication practices, despite their apparent – and ultimately superficial – 
differences. 
 
In short, Leibniz’s theoretical metaphysics invites us to expect that across different species, 
the simple units and syntactical rules of combination of their communications are essentially 
the same. Although different signs or symbols may be used to refer to these units and 
combinations, in much the same way as Europeans and Chinese used different terms to refer 
to God,  we may discover cross-species correlations of simple elements and structured 
ordering. With such a common base, each species might in principle be taught to 
communicate in the language of another species, just as Europeans and Chinese communicate 
across cultures when they learn each others’ languages. Alternatively, cross-species 
communication might be facilitated by the development of a universal language available to 
all species, akin to the universl human language that Leibniz hoped would enhance 
understanding across human cultures. In practice, however, neither of these methods is 
feasible as a means of communication across human and nonhuman species or between 
different nonhuman species: differences in physical make-up of diverse species are simply 
too great to permit of one single means of vocalization by some or across all species. 
 
                                                     
31 One well-documented example of  expressive behavior is the honeybee waggle dance. See for 
instance Preece and Beekman (2014). 
 
A further possibility, however, is provided by the Wild Dolphin Project’s CHAT system. 
CHAT can be used, not just as a decoder and translation tool, but also as an interface that can 
to some extent overcome the communication hurdles posed by differences in organisms’ 
vocalization abilities (Herzing 2014a). Such interface technology, suitably adapted to the 
physical capabilities of particular species, has the potential to turn every language into a 
universal language.32 The results for human-dolphin two-way communication using CHAT 
remain limited at this very early stage. However, the potential is promising. Talking about 
CHAT in October 2015, Herzing commented: 
 
I’ve been waiting thirty years for this tool. It’s a good example of how important 
interdisciplinary work is. I mean, as biologists, we live in our little biology world and 
we don’t know you have these great tools in computer science sometime. And to also 
mention that there are many data sets out there – in my own field and in marine 
ecology and in prairie dog work – that would use this same tool (it doesn’t have to be 
dolphin vocalizations) to mine the data and really start looking at a lot of systems. So, 
we’re excited about applying this to other colleagues as well - and their lovely data 
sets. (Herzing and Starner 2015) 
 
Future refinement and development of CHAT as a cross-species communication interface 
may bring the biological sciences close to realizing Leibniz’s dream of a truly universal 
language. Full realization is a long way off, but at least for now, mutual exchange between 
humans and dolphins, similar to the mutual exchange between the Europeans and the 
Chinese, is a live possibility. 
 
Concluding remarks 
No obvious historical narrative links Leibniz directly to Herzing. Nevertheless Leibniz’s 
thought and vision undoubtedly played a part in shaping the social, cultural and educational 
environment and aspirations from which the Wild Dolphin Project has arisen. Without 
Leibniz’s re-discovery of binary arithmetic, the computer technology that is driving forward 
his particular vision of a universal language facilitating cultural exchange would be 
unavailable. We can draw inspiration from his persistence to establish truly interdisciplinary 
                                                     
32 In this regard, Douglas Adam’s science fiction depiction of the Babel fish in the Hitchhiker’s Guide 
to the Galaxy may prove prescient (Adams 2009 [1979], 55). 
 
research academies where findings of theoretical research give rise to practical projects 
directed to the common good. Interdisciplinary research has been key to the ongoing success 
of the Wild Dolphin Project, but even more significant is the potential of this project to 
enhance the common good by increasing our understanding of, and two-way communication 
with, other living beings. 
 
Leibniz’s analysis of concepts, their representation by characters, his promotion of Chinese 
cultural exchange and his efforts to establish interdisciplinary academies were not just an 
epistemological exercise in the documentation and advancement of human knowledge. 
Leibniz’s overriding primary goal was the advancement of peace and harmony among 
peoples and cultures through mutual understanding and respect. Might we now also reach out 
to other species, as Herzing has done with the Atlantic spotted dolphins, engaging with them 
in cultural exchange? And as we come to understand them and they us, might we also, 
following Leibniz’s lead, hope that mutual understanding and respect will help establish 
sufficient common ground and shared purpose to underpin a long overdue ecological 
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